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Abstract
This note proposes the Price Augmented Risk Premium (PARP), a decompo-
sition of the multivariage risk premium associated with price and income uncer-
tainty. The PARP is used to measure the likely impact on welfare arising from
price ﬂuctuations experienced by UK households over the period 1963-97.
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1 Introduction.
Ever since the seminal work of Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944), much of the
literature on consumer welfare under uncertainty has focused on uncertainty in income.
However, consumers also face uncertainty in prices and this raises the possibility that
uncertainty may increase expected welfare. This is because relative price movements
may create additional opportunities for consumers to substitute between goods. The
aim of this paper is to extend the analysis of consumer utility to include price uncer-
tainty as well as income uncertainty. In order to do this the Price Augmented Risk
Premium (PARP), a decomposition of the scalar multivariate risk premium, is proposed
and estimated.
In much of the research, the multivariate risk premium has been deﬁned as a vector
of risk premia the economic agent is prepared to pay to avoid the uncertainty associated
with each stochastic variable. This deﬁnition can be found in Pratt (1964) where it is
called “risk aversion in the small”, in Kihlstrom and Mirman (1974) where it is called
the “directional risk premium” and in Duncan (1977) where it is called the “approxi-
mate risk premium vector”. To the best of my knowledge, the ﬁrst formal deﬁnition of
a multivariate risk premium as a scalar is to be found in Karni (1979). Karni calls this
the “risk premium of local risk aversion” which has the same speciﬁcation as the pre-
mium deﬁned in equation (1) below. Karni’s contribution is to state “the restrictions
that must be imposed on ... two utility functions in order that one requires a higher
risk premium than another for every small multivariate risk.”1
The PARP proposed in equation (6) is a decomposition of Karni’s risk premium into
components that are and are not aﬀected by monotonic transformations of the utility
function. Components aﬀected by monotonic transformations of the utility function
are associated with much studied attitudes to income risk aversion. Components not
aﬀected by monotonic transformation of the utility function depend only on ordinal
aspects of preferences which can be estimated using standard demand systems.
In section 2 the theory underlying the scalar multivariate risk premium and its
decomposition into the PARP are outlined. In section 3 the PARP is estimated using
data on UK households. Section 4 concludes.
2 The Theory.
Presented in the next two sub-sections are the Scalar Multivariate Risk Premium and
its reformulation into the Price Augmented Risk Premium. Equation (6) illustates
how the multivariate risk premium nests the risk premium based on the Arrow-Pratt
measure of Absolute Risk Aversion.
2.1 The Scalar Multivariate Risk Premium.
This sub-section recalls the multivariate risk premium developed by Karni and reported
in equation (3.1) of his 1979 paper. Any risk premium is generally deﬁned as the
diﬀerence between the expected value of a lottery and the certainty equivalent of that
lottery.2 If an individual is facing a fair lottery, fair insofar as the expected payoﬀ is
1Karni (1979), page 1391.
2See Kreps (1990), page 82, for this deﬁnition of the risk premium.
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zero, the same risk premium can equivalently be deﬁned as the maximum the individual
is prepared to pay to avoid the fair lottery. The scalar multivariate risk premium
presented here is deﬁned as the maximum the individual is prepared to pay in order
to avoid a fair lottery in price and income uncertainty. Thus, this premium is the
monetary value the consumer puts on removing all variances and covariances in prices
and income. The lottery in this case is fair, by construct, because the expected payoﬀ
is taken at the mean expected values of the stochastic variables using second order
Taylor series approximations. This premium is therefore not the exact risk premium3
but rather a risk premium for localised (small) uncertainty.
Proposition 1 Deﬁne the multivariate risk premium by equating expected utility under
uncertainty to utility under no uncertainty once the risk premium π has been paid,
E[V (Ψ)] = V (E[Ψ]− Π). This multivariate risk premium is approximated by,
π ≈ 1
2
n∑
i=1
−∂2V/∂pi∂pi
∂V/∂m
σpipi +
n∑
i=1
n∑
j =i
−∂2V/∂pi∂pj
∂V/∂m
σpipj
+
n∑
i=1
−∂2V/∂pi∂m
∂V/∂m
σpim +
1
2
−∂2V/(∂m)2
∂V/∂m
σmm. (1)
where all derivatives are evaluated at mean values, E[.] is the expectations operator,
V (.) represents the indirect utility function, mt represents total expenditure at time t,
σ’s represent the covariances σxy = cov(x, y), the p’s represent prices,
Π =

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0
0
...
0
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

, Ψ =


p1
p2
...
pn
m


, Ψ¯ =


p¯1
p¯2
...
p¯n
m¯


,
and Ψ¯ represents the mean values of Ψ.
Proof. The PARP is deﬁned by equating expected utility under uncertainty to utility
under no uncertainty once the risk premium has been paid and prices and incomes
have been ﬁxed at their expected mean values. This is expressed by,
E[V (Ψ)] = V (E[Ψ]− Π) (2)
where E[.] is the expectations operator. Taking Taylor Series approximations of the
left and right hand sides of equation (2) gives equations (3) and (4) respectively.
E[V (Ψ)] ≈ E
[
V (Ψ) + VΨ(Ψ− Ψ¯) + 12(Ψ− Ψ¯)′ ∂
2V
(∂Ψ)2
(Ψ− Ψ¯)
]
≈ V (Ψ¯) + 1
2
E
[
(Ψ− Ψ¯)′ ∂2V
(∂Ψ)2
(Ψ− Ψ¯)
]
≈ V (Ψ¯) + 1
2
m∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
∂2V
∂pi∂pj
σpipj (3)
3Copeland and Weston (1983), pages 85-90.
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V (E[Ψ]− Π) ≈ V (E[Ψ])− π(∂V/∂Ψ)
≈ V (Ψ¯)− π(∂V/∂m) (4)
Substituting (4) and (3) into (2) gives the approximation,
π ≈ −1
2
m∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
∂2V/∂pi∂pj
∂V/∂m
σpipj (5)
for the PARP. Substituting m for pm and re-arranging gives equation (1). end proof.
Equation (1) is a generalisation of the standard measure of the income risk pre-
mium, π = 1
2
(−∂2V/(∂m)2
∂V/∂m
)
σmm, where the term in brackets is the Arrow-Pratt measure
of Absolute Risk Aversion (ARA) and the coeﬃcient of Relative Risk Aversion (RRA)
is ARA/m. The multivariate risk premium cannot be signed a priori because though
quasi-convexity of the indirect utility function with respect to m is suﬃcient to deter-
mine that the Arrow-Pratt measure of Absolute Risk Aversion is positive, the other
derivatives in equation (1) cannot be signed.
2.2 The Price Augmented Risk Premium.
While succinct, the formulation in (1) is not transparently related to the substitution
responses that presumably shape attitudes to price uncertainty and their interaction
with income risk aversion. The proposed PARP provides a decomposition of the scalar
multivariate risk premium into components that relate to income eﬀects, substitution
eﬀects and uncompensated price eﬀects.
Proposition 2 The multivariate risk premium (1) may be decomposed into the PARP,
π = πie + πse + πue, (6)
πie =
1
2
(
RRA
m¯
)σmm + n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
x¯ix¯jσpipj − 2
n∑
i=1
x¯iσpim


πse =
1
2
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
ehij
(
x¯i
p¯j
)
σpipj
πue =
n∑
i=1
emi
(
x¯i
m¯t
)σpim +
n∑
j=1
x¯jσpipj


where the x’s represent the demands for the goods and the x¯’s represent the mean
values for those demands, ehij’s represent the Hicksian (compensated) price elasticities
of demand and emi ’s represent the income elasticities of demand.
Proof. Diﬀerentiating Roy’s identity ∂V/∂pi = −(∂V/∂m)xi(p,m), with respect to m
and p gives the following three expressions:
A(pi,m) = −A(m,m)x¯i + ∂xi/∂m
A(pj,m) = −A(m,m)x¯j + ∂xj/∂m
A(pi, pj) = −A(m, pj)x¯i + ∂xi/∂pj
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where A(x, y) = −∂
2V/∂x∂y
∂V/∂m
. Substituting A(pj,m) into A(pi, pj) gives,
A(pi, pj) = −A(m,m)x¯ix¯j − ∂xj
∂m
x¯i +
∂xi
∂pj
(7)
Substituting Shephard’s Lemma ∂xi/∂pj = (∂x
u
i /∂pj)− (∂xi/∂m)x¯j, into (7) gives
A(pi, pj) = −A(m,m)x¯ix¯j + ∂x
u
i
∂pj
− ∂xj
∂m
x¯i − ∂xi
∂m
x¯j (8)
when i = j equation (8) simpliﬁes to
A(pi, pi) = −A(m,m)x¯2i +
∂xui
∂pi
− 2∂xi
∂m
x¯i (9)
Substituting A(pj,m), A(pi, pj) and A(pi, pi) into equation (1) and rearranging gives
equation (6). end proof.
The ﬁrst component in equation (6) represents attitudes to risk aversion, the second
and third components represent attitudes to ordinal preferences. The ﬁrst component
πie contains the terms relating to risk aversion in real budget ﬂuctuations about the
mean bundle. Note that in this ﬁrst component all the terms are pre-multiplied by
RRA
m¯
= −∂
2V/(∂m)2
∂V/∂m
, the standard Arrow-Pratt measure of ARA. Note also that, the
income variance term σmm appears only in this ﬁrst component and is unambiguously
detrimental to consumer welfare, if risk aversion in income is assumed. The second
component πse represents the substitution opportunities arising from relative price
movements, this contains all the terms relating to compensated demands for the goods.
The third component πue represents the (residual) uncompensated price eﬀects.
2.3 Consistency Checks.
This sub-section two consistency checks are applied to the PARP. The ﬁrst is to check
that the PARP does not violate the assumption of homogeneity in the demand system
and the second is to identifying a form of price variance that consumers ﬁnd desirable
irrespective of preferences.
The ﬁrst consistency check is that the property of homogeneity of degree (HOD)
zero in the demand system extends to the PARP. For example, HOD zero in the
demand system implies that if income and all prices double the consumer is no better
and no worse oﬀ. This property extends to the PARP insofar as when all prices and
income ﬂuctuate by the same proportion the PARP equals zero implying that these
ﬂuctuations have no impact on consumer welfare. For a formal proof see appendix A.
The second consistency check involves identifying a form of price uncertainty that
unambiguously increases welfare (so long a goods are not perfect complements). A
desirable form of price uncertainty, limited to the two good case, is identiﬁed and
is found to be desirable regardless of the choice of utility function. On an intuitive
level, this form of uncertainty can be thought of as a “real income preserving spread”
process, i.e. price ﬂuctuations may cause the budget constraint to ﬂuctuate but the
bundle chosen under the non-stochastic price equivalent can always be aﬀorded. For
a formal proof see appendix B. This result raises the possibility that other forms of
price and income uncertainty may be welfare enhancing.
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3 An Application.
The PARP is estimated for a “representative” UK household using equation (6), infor-
mation on consumers’ expenditure (see sub-section 3.1) and information on consumers’
preferences (see sub-section 3.2). The household is representative insofar as mean ex-
penditure for the household is derived by dividing aggregate UK consumer expenditure
by estimates of the number of UK households. Estimates of the PARP for the repre-
sentative household and for households representative of the expenditure quintiles are
reported in sub-section 3.3.
3.1 The Data on Consumers’ Expenditure.
The data4 are seasonally unadjusted and refer to the consumption of non-durable
goods in the UK over the period 1963q1-1997q4. Summary statistics on product cat-
egories, expenditure shares and total expenditures are given in Table 1. The highest
mean expenditure share is for product category 4.1 (Electricity, Gas, Coal & Coke)
with mean(w4.1) = 0.092. The second highest is for product category 2.1 (Beer) with
mean(w2.1) = 0.091. From the same table one can see that the highest mean expendi-
ture is for product category 2.1, mean(x2.1) = £171.06. Total expenditure is based on
total expenditure at 1990 prices divided by the number of household in the UK.5 Sum-
mary statistics on total expenditure by the “representative” household are given in the
last row of Table 1, from this one can see that mean total expenditure on non-durables,
per quarter, for the representative household is £1493.45.
For brevity, statistics for prices and covariances are not reported. Prices have been
deﬁned by dividing the implicit deﬂator for each commodity group by the implicit
deﬂator for total expenditure. Covariances between prices and total expenditure are
based on the whole sample period, this implies that the covariance structure for the
sample period is representative of the expected covariance structure for each sub-period.
3.2 The Estimated Preference Structure.
The preference structure over goods for the representative household is derived from
elasticities estimated using an AIDS and by deﬁning a coeﬃcient of RRA. The for-
mulation of the AIDS and derivation of the elasticities is given in appendix C. The
coeﬃcient of RRA is set equal to one, the reasons for choosing this calibration are elab-
orated upon in appendix D. Estimates of the elasticities based on parameter estimates
of an AIDS restricted for both Homogeneity and Symmetry are reported in Table 2.
The estimated preference structure is that for the “representative” household. Sum-
mary statistics on the compensated cross-price elasticities are not reported as these
represent an additional 38*38-38 = 1406 time series. Parameter estimates of the AIDS
are reported in appendix E.
All the elasticities seem reasonable with the exception of the compensated own
elasticities (ehii) for product categories 2.2, 7.2 and 8.1. In these categories maximum
4The data are taken from the Oﬃce for National Statistics publication “Consumer Trends”, this
in turn, is based on data from the UK Family Expenditure Surveys.
5The number of households is based on population estimates from “Monthly Digest of Statistics”,
table 2.1 and from estimates of household size from the “General Household Surveys”. This gives
mid-year estimates and values for each quarter are generated by interpolation.
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Product group: wit £xit
i mean min max mean min max
1.1 Bread, Cakes, 0.043 0.034 0.055 63.37 51.10 72.98
Biscuits & Cereals.
1.2 Meat and Bacon. 0.080 0.060 0.109 114.56 81.97 145.00
1.3 Fish. 0.012 0.009 0.019 19.45 12.11 29.83
1.4 Milk, Cheese & Eggs. 0.047 0.026 0.059 69.63 48.76 98.49
1.5 Oils and Fats. 0.010 0.005 0.013 11.58 8.59 14.73
1.6 Fruit. 0.018 0.013 0.023 25.33 15.59 41.49
1.7 Potatoes. 0.013 0.008 0.016 19.61 3.82 34.16
1.8 Vegetables. 0.022 0.016 0.033 31.09 15.08 64.33
1.9 Sugar. 0.005 0.001 0.010 7.09 2.19 14.79
1.10 Confectionery. 0.025 0.020 0.033 36.44 25.69 47.92
1.11 Tea, Coﬀee & Cocoa. 0.011 0.006 0.015 16.00 8.38 23.85
1.12 Soft Drinks. 0.014 0.005 0.028 21.18 4.57 53.69
1.13 Other Foodstuﬀs. 0.010 0.008 0.014 13.82 9.31 20.61
2.1 Beer. 0.091 0.057 0.129 171.06 85.68 266.98
2.2 Spirits. 0.031 0.013 0.057 45.96 12.99 104.40
2.3 Wine. 0.020 0.006 0.035 28.91 5.81 63.47
2.4 Cider & Perry. 0.004 0.002 0.008 7.40 3.07 12.88
2.5 Tobacco. 0.086 0.038 0.136 146.81 47.97 250.98
3.1 Men’s & boys’ Clothing. 0.034 0.026 0.051 46.75 22.95 110.75
3.2 Women’s & girls’ Clothing. 0.062 0.035 0.116 83.38 21.76 259.16
3.3 Footwear. 0.023 0.015 0.030 32.09 13.26 65.37
4.1 Electricity, Gas, 0.092 0.057 0.148 147.57 75.99 228.35
Coal & Coke.
4.2 Petrol and Engine Oil. 0.056 0.022 0.073 82.23 29.23 118.78
5.1 Cleaning. 0.013 0.009 0.015 19.01 15.41 22.83
5.2 DIY goods. 0.024 0.011 0.037 36.50 13.95 61.25
5.3 Textiles & soft furnishings. 0.013 0.008 0.019 17.49 7.57 42.86
5.4 Hardware. 0.019 0.014 0.022 29.40 17.19 38.77
6.1 Books. 0.009 0.006 0.014 20.25 9.01 38.62
6.2 Newpapers. 0.021 0.010 0.035 45.39 17.86 110.43
6.3 Magazines. 0.008 0.005 0.012 16.78 8.05 34.46
7.1 Spectacles. 0.003 0.002 0.007 5.09 1.74 13.39
7.2 Medication. 0.008 0.006 0.012 13.57 8.39 19.04
7.3 Toiletries. 0.024 0.015 0.036 36.60 17.89 60.28
8.1 Sporting goods & toys. 0.015 0.004 0.033 21.83 3.67 72.35
8.2 Jewelry. 0.013 0.007 0.023 19.38 9.48 42.98
8.3 Records. 0.008 0.002 0.029 10.71 1.22 53.42
8.4 Photographic equipment. 0.003 0.001 0.006 4.10 0.52 10.69
8.5 Pets. 0.012 0.008 0.017 16.14 10.09 25.75
Total 1.000 1.000 1.000 1493.45 1272.68 1915.79
Table 1: Summary Statistics for Weights and Expenditures.
wit is the expenditure share and £xit is the expenditure
at 1990 prices on product group i at time t.
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Product group: eh(ii)t e
m
it
i mean min max mean min max
1.1 Bread, Cakes, -1.08 -1.12 -1.05 0.33 0.15 0.48
Biscuits & Cereals.
1.2 Meat & Bacon. -1.46 -1.64 -1.28 0.44 0.26 0.60
1.3 Fish. -1.85 -2.15 -1.51 0.03 -0.32 0.40
1.4 Milk, Cheese & Eggs. -1.40 -1.72 -1.28 0.22 -0.32 0.41
1.5 Oils & Fats. -0.52 -0.68 -0.16 0.10 -0.60 0.40
1.6 Fruit. -1.68 -1.92 -1.50 0.16 -0.13 0.37
1.7 Potatoes. -1.21 -1.36 -1.15 0.47 0.11 0.59
1.8 Vegetables. -1.30 -1.42 -1.18 -0.01 -0.36 0.33
1.9 Sugar. -1.30 -1.76 -1.10 1.16 1.06 1.41
1.10 Confectionery. -0.75 -0.80 -0.71 1.51 1.39 1.63
1.11 Tea, Coﬀee & Cocoa. -0.75 -0.82 -0.57 0.17 -0.48 0.43
1.12 Soft Drinks. -1.27 -1.62 -1.08 0.25 -0.67 0.71
1.13 Other Foodstuﬀs. -1.57 -1.74 -1.41 -0.29 -0.67 0.05
2.1 Beer. -1.00 -1.08 -0.93 0.74 0.59 0.82
2.2 Spirits. 0.90 0.03 3.02 4.19 2.62 7.96
2.3 Wine. -1.94 -3.83 -1.42 3.76 2.34 9.01
2.4 Cider & Perry. -1.35 -1.80 -1.15 0.94 0.85 0.97
2.5 Tobacco. -0.68 -0.74 -0.46 0.13 -0.77 0.51
3.1 Men’s & Boys’ Clothing. -2.12 -2.47 -1.69 2.44 1.94 2.85
3.2 Women’s & Girls’ Clothing. -0.41 -0.61 -0.14 2.46 1.72 3.38
3.3 Footwear. -2.49 -3.28 -2.09 1.73 1.54 2.11
4.1 Electricity, Gas, -0.77 -0.78 -0.73 0.53 0.28 0.72
Coal & Coke.
4.2 Petrol & Engine Oil. -0.79 -0.81 -0.61 0.18 -1.00 0.40
5.1 Cleaning. -0.85 -0.87 -0.79 -0.48 -0.98 -0.18
5.2 DIY goods. -1.23 -1.49 -1.11 0.05 -0.89 0.45
5.3 Textiles & soft furnishings. -4.04 -5.51 -2.97 0.58 0.38 0.73
5.4 Hardware. -0.75 -0.79 -0.68 1.66 1.55 1.89
6.1 Books. -1.51 -1.78 -1.30 3.88 2.77 5.32
6.2 Newpapers. -1.30 -1.57 -1.14 0.43 -0.04 0.69
6.3 Magazines. -1.40 -1.58 -1.24 0.29 -0.01 0.57
7.1 Spectacles. -1.84 -2.51 -1.31 -0.59 -1.83 0.40
7.2 Medication. -0.26 -0.48 0.03 0.36 0.11 0.55
7.3 Toiletries. -1.26 -1.42 -1.15 1.40 1.26 1.61
8.1 Sporting goods & toys. 1.01 -0.23 4.29 4.09 2.12 9.23
8.2 Jewelry. -0.66 -0.79 -0.49 4.32 2.74 6.36
8.3 Records. -0.85 -0.94 -0.63 8.83 2.24 24.81
8.4 Photographic equipment. -1.71 -3.01 -1.26 -0.05 -1.97 0.61
8.5 Pets. -1.49 -1.67 -1.31 -0.18 -0.59 0.23
Table 2: Summary statistics for Price and Income Elasticities.
eh(ii)t is the compensated own price elasticity and e
m
it is the
income elaticity for product group i at time t.
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Variable mean min max
πie,t (income eﬀect) £7.62 £4.51 £18.55
πse,t (substitution eﬀect) £-13.08 £-25.58 £-4.71
πue,t (uncompensated eﬀect) £-1.33 £-5.33 £13.54
πt (PARP) £-6.78 £-20.73 £18.78
mt (total expenditure) £1493.45 £1272.68 £1915.79
100πt
mt
-0.48% -1.44% 0.94%
Table 3: Summary statistics on the PARP for the
representative household, 1963q1-1997q4.
values suggest that for at least some observations these compensated own elasticities
are positive. These discrepancies in the elasticities may arise for a number of rea-
sons. These reasons include aggregation over products, aggregation over households,
measurement errors, and failure to model the non-stationary nature of the data.6
Estimates of the income elasticities (emi ) suggest that most goods are necessities.
Product categories classiﬁed as inferior by their mean income elasticities are 1.8, 1.13,
5.1, 7.1, 8.4 and 8.5. The product categories classiﬁed as superior by their mean income
elasticities are 2.2, 2.3, 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 5.4, 6.1, 7.3, 8.1, 8.2 and 8.3. Some of these
elasticities may seem dubious in light of the products represented by the categories,
these discrepancies are likely have arisen for the reasons outlined above.
3.3 Estimates of the PARP.
The PARP for the representative UK household, in each quarter, is estimated using
the expenditures given by the data, the preference structure estimated using the AIDS
and by setting the coeﬃcient of RRA to one. Summary statistics on values of the
components of the PARP are reported in table 3. The minimum value for the com-
ponent relating to income eﬀects shows it to be always positive, this represents the
amount the representative household would be willing to pay in order to avoid these
pure income (expenditure) ﬂuctuations. The maximum value for the component relat-
ing to substitution eﬀects show it to be always negative, this represents the amount the
representative household would have to be compensated to have these substitution op-
portunities removed. The component relating to the uncompensated price eﬀects takes
on both negative and positive values, suggesting that the net eﬀects acting through the
income elasticities can be either welfare enhancing or reducing. The overall value of the
PARP takes on both negative and positive values but the mean value is negative, this
suggest that on average the price and expenditure ﬂuctuations are welfare enhancing
for the representative household. This welfare gain represents roughly £6.78 per quar-
ter at 1990 prices. As a proportion of total expenditure this gain is small, representing
just 0.48% of total expenditure on non-durables.
6Failure to model the non-stationarity of the data is the greatest shortcoming. The data exhibits
non-stationarity with the presence of unit roots and seasonal roots. Dealing with non-stationary data
that contains seasonal components is non-trivial and is therefore left as a future extension.
10
Variable Quintile 1 Quintile 2 Quintile 3 Quintile 4 Quintile 5
mean(πie) £18.71 £10.43 £7.87 £6.82 £6.10
mean(πse) £-5.73 £-9.48 £-12.59 £-15.19 £-20.05
mean(πue) £-3.69 £-2.58 £-1.51 £-0.50 £1.64
mean(π) £9.28 £-1.63 £-6.23 £-8.88 £-12.31
mean(m) £507.77 £970.74 £1418.78 £1836.95 £2733.02
mean(100π
m
) 1.85% -0.19% -0.47% -0.52% -0.48%
Table 4: Mean values over the time interval by
expenditure quintiles, 1963q1-1997q4.
The same values are also used to estimate the PARP for households “representative”
of ﬁve expenditure quintiles. Given one cannot use the data to estimate the preference
structure for households at diﬀerent expenditure levels, this preference structure is
generated by assuming the underlying parameters estimated by the AIDS hold for
all households. Expenditures, demands and elasticities are generated for households
representative of each quintile by altering the value of total expenditure according to
total expenditure statistics from the UK Family Expenditure Survey. These statistics
suggest that expenditures in the ﬁve quintiles represent 34%, 65%, 95%, 123% and 183%
respectively of expenditure on non-durables in the mean representative household.
Summary statistics for the PARP and its components in each expenditure quintile are
reported in table 4, these suggest that the greater the level of expenditure the larger
the gains arising from price uncertainty. These gains increase as a proportion of total
expenditure on non-durables up to the fourth quintile and then fall slightly for the ﬁfth
quintile. The only households to experience a net loss from the price ﬂuctuations are
those in the lowest expenditure quintile.
4 Conclusion.
The empirical results suggest the overall value of the PARP (π) is positive for house-
holds in the lowest expenditure quintile suggesting price uncertainty is welfare reducing
for this group, and negative for the other quintiles suggesting price uncertainty is wel-
fare enhancing for these groups. For all household types and in all time periods the
component relating to income eﬀects πie is positive, suggesting pure income ﬂuctua-
tions are always welfare reducing. The component relating to substitution eﬀects πse
is always negative, suggesting substitution opportunities are welfare enhancing. The
component relating to uncompensated price eﬀects πue varies in sign and its magnitude
is relatively small.
As we have seen, uncertainty in prices of non-durable goods may be desirable or
undesirable, according to the structure of the uncertainty and the form of preferences.
This in itself is not a new idea. What is new is the decomposition with which it is
presented. This is the familiar framework of the Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk
aversion, expanded into price space. Unfortunately, this analysis may be unrealistic
insofar as it allows the consumer too much freedom in his decision-making. The con-
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sumer in these examples is not aﬀected by liquidity constraints, nor by the need to
purchase consumer durables. In practice it is probably factors such as liquidity con-
straints, the need to purchase durables and the cost of acquiring information in an
uncertain environment that generate the greatest costs in an uncertain environment.
A more complete analysis would add to these other factors to the PARP.
Appendix.
A Homogeneity in the Demand System.
Conjecture 1 If all prices and income vary in a collinear manner, then the risk pre-
mium associated with avoiding this form of uncertainty is equal to zero, i.e. if Ψ = λΨ¯,
where λ is a scalar and Ψ, Ψ¯ are the vectors deﬁned on page 4, then π = 0. In this
special case, where the consumer faces stochastic income and prices but can observe
income and prices at the point of purchase, a proportionate change in income and all
prices will leave the consumer’s utility unchanged.
Proof. The indirect utility function is homogenous of degree zero implying7 V (λΨ) =
λ0V (Ψ), for all λ, this can be expressed as 0 = ∂V
∂m
m +
∑n
i=1
∂V
∂pi
pi. By substituting in
Roy’s identity (−∂V/∂p)/(∂V/∂m) = xi, this can be re-written as,
0 =
∂V
∂m
(
m−
n∑
i=1
xipi
)
(10)
Homogeneity of degree zero in the indirect utility function also implies ∂V/∂Ψ is ho-
mogenous of degree minus one, implying8 λ(∂V/∂Ψ)(λΨ) = ∂V/∂Ψ. Diﬀerentiating
with respect to λ gives the following two expressions:
∂V
∂pi
+
n∑
j=1
∂2V
∂pi∂pj
pj +
∂2V
∂pi∂m
pi = 0 (11)
∂V
∂m
+
∂2V
(∂m)2
m+
n∑
j=1
∂2V
∂m∂pj
pj = 0 (12)
The assumptions on the price variations imply:
σpipj = pipjλ
2, σpim = pimλ
2, σmm = m
2λ2, ∀i, j = 1...n (13)
Substituting in equations (13) into equation (1) and rearranging gives:
π =
−λ2
2 ∂V
∂m

 n∑
i=1

pi

 ∂2V
∂pi∂m
pi +
n∑
j=1
∂2V
∂pi∂pj
pj



+m
(
∂2V
(∂m)2
m+
n∑
i=1
∂2V
∂pi∂m
pi
)
(14)
Substituting in equations (11) and (12) into the above expression, and then substituting
in equation (10) gives: π = 1
2
λ2
∂V
∂m
(
∂V
∂m
m+
∑n
i=1
∂V
∂pi
pi
)
= 0. Thus the risk premium for
covariances that keep relative prices and income constant is equal to zero. end proof.
7see Dixit and Norman (1988), pages 312-313. Varian (1992), pages 17-18.
8Ibid.
12
B A Desirable Form of Price Uncertainty.
Proposition 3 Consider a consumer who consumes just two goods. If income m¯ is
constant but prices ﬂuctuate such that the following equality always holds: p1x¯1+p2x¯2 =
m¯, where x¯1 and x¯2 are ﬁxed at levels optimal under the zero price variance case. Then,
the expected risk premium is negative π < 0 and the consumer is better oﬀ than under
the certainty price equivalent.
Proof Assume there are price ﬂuctuations where the following equality always holds:
p1x¯1 + p2x¯2 = m¯, this satisﬁes p1x¯1 = −p2x¯2 + m¯, which can be re-written as:
var(p1x¯1) = var(p2x¯2) (15)
and also satisﬁes var(p1x¯1 + p2x¯2) = 0, which can be re-written as:
var(p1x¯1) + var(p2x¯2) + 2cov(p1x¯1, p2x¯2) = 0 (16)
Substituting equation (15) into equation (16) gives:
2var(p1x¯1) + 2cov(p1x¯1, p2x¯2) = 0
var(p1x¯1) = var(p2x¯2) = −cov(p1x¯1, p2x¯2)
x¯21σp1p1 = x¯
2
2σp2p2 = −x¯1x¯2σp1p2 (17)
Any indiﬀerence curve of the indirect utility function may either be expressed as func-
tion of prices at constant level of utility as expressed, say, by: V (p1, p2) = u¯, or the
same indiﬀerence curve can be expressed by one price as a function of the other price
and constant utility: p1 = f(p2, u¯). Substituting the latter into the former gives:
V (f(p2, u¯), p2) = u¯. Diﬀerentiating this with respect to p2 provides a deﬁnition for
the slope of the indiﬀerence curve ∂V
∂p1
∂f
∂p2
+ ∂V
∂p2
= 0, which implies ∂f
∂p2
= − ∂V
∂p2
/ ∂V
∂p1
.
Equating this with Roy’s Identity provides the ratio of demands for the two goods at
any given level of utility:
∂f
∂p2
=
(−∂V/∂p2
∂V/∂p1
∣∣∣∣∣
u¯
)
= −
(−(∂V/∂p2)/(∂V/∂m)
−(∂V/∂p1)/(∂V/∂m)
∣∣∣∣∣
u¯
)
= −x2
x1
(18)
The strict quasi-convexity condition for the indiﬀerence curve can therefore be ex-
pressed on (18) by the condition
∂
∂p2
(−∂V/∂p2
∂V/∂p1
∣∣∣∣∣
u¯
)
> 0 (19)
Carrying out the diﬀerentiation, substituting in (18), substituting in Roy’s identity
and substituting in (17) gives
∂
( −∂V/∂p2
∂V/∂p1
∣∣∣
u¯
)
∂p2
=
1(
∂V
∂p1
)2
(−∂V
∂p2
(
∂V 2
∂p1∂p1
∂f
∂p2
+ ∂V
2
∂p1∂p2
)
+ ∂V
∂p1
(
∂V 2
∂p1∂p2
∂f
∂p2
+ ∂V
2
∂p1∂p2
))
=
x¯2
(
∂V
∂m
)
(
∂V
∂p1
)2
(
∂V 2
(∂p1)2
σp1p1 +
∂V 2
(∂p2)2
σp2p2 + 2
∂V 2
∂p1∂p2
σp1p2
)
(20)
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Applying property (19) to equation (20) implies inequality (21) holds.
∂V 2
(∂p1)2
σp1p1 +
∂V 2
(∂p2)2
σp2p2 + 2
∂V 2
∂p1∂p2
σp1p2 > 0 (21)
Imposing var(m¯) = 0 and the inequality (21) on equation (1) deﬁnes a negative risk
premium: π =
(
1
2
∂V 2
(∂p1)2
σp1p1 +
1
2
∂V 2
(∂p2)2
σp2p2 +
∂V 2
∂p1∂p2
σp1p2
)/−∂V
∂m
< 0. end proof.
C The Almost Ideal Demand System.
In this sub-section the equations that form the theoretical basis of the AIDS and of the
preference structure for the representative household are presented. The logarithmic
AIDS cost function taken from Deaton and Muellbauer (1980), is given in equation
(22) below which can be expressed more compactly in terms of direct utility and the
functions a{p} and b{p},
ln c{u, p} = a{p}+ ub{p} (22)
where,
a{p} = α0 +∑nk=1 αk ln pk + 12 ∑nk=1∑nj=1 γ∗kj ln pk ln pj (23)
b{p} = β0∏nk=1 pβkk . (24)
the α’s β’s and γ’s are parameters, m is nominal income, u is direct utility and the p’s
are prices for each commodity category. Taking the exponential of equation (22) gives
the expenditure function in non logarithmic terms,
c{u, p} = exp (a{p}+ ub{p}) (25)
Inverting the AIDS expenditure function gives the indirect utility function, V {m, p},
represented by equation (26).
V {m, p} = lnm− a{p}
b{p} (26)
In order to estimate the demand system, expressions for the budget shares for
each commodity category are deﬁned. This is done by diﬀerentiating equation (22)
with respect to ln pi and substituting in uβ0
∏n
k=1 p
βk
k = ln(M/P ), where lnP = α0 +∑n
k=1 αk ln pk +
1
2
∑n
k=1
∑n
j=1 γ
∗
kj ln pk ln pj. This gives equation (27) which is equation
(8) in Deaton and Muellbauer.
wi = +
n∑
j=1
γij ln pj + βi ln(m/P )αi (27)
where wi = piqi/c{u, p} is the budget share for good i and γij = 12(γ∗ij + γ∗ij). Note
that the expression for γij is not the condition of symmetry described below, it is a
condition satisﬁed by construct in the system, see Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) page
313. Equation (27) represents the system of equations that are generally estimated
in these kinds of models. To facilitate estimation, most researchers replace the exact
price index lnP = α0+
∑n
k=1 αk ln pk+
1
2
∑n
k=1
∑n
j=1 γ
∗
kj ln pk ln pj. with the Stone Price
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Index Approximation lnP =
∑n
k=1wk ln pk. Indeed, this substitution is used in the
original work by Deaton and Muellbauer.
To be consistent with the theory of consumer demand the demand system should
satisfy the restrictions of additivity, homogeneity and symmetry. Additivity simply
requires that the sum of all individual expenditures equals total expenditure. Homo-
geneity is the requirement that all demand functions in the system should be homoge-
nous of degree zero, such that if all prices and total expenditure change by the same
multiplicative term then demands do not change. Symmetry requires that the com-
pensated cross price derivatives between two goods should be equal, for example, the
compensated cross price derivative of potatoes with respect to a change in the price
of ﬁsh should equal the compensated cross price derivative of ﬁsh with respect to a
change in the price of potatoes. These imply the following restrictions on the AIDS
model:
Additivity:
∑n
i=1 αi = 1 and
∑n
i=1 βi =
∑n
i=1 γij = 0
Homogeneity:
∑n
j=1 γij = 0
Symmetry: γij = γji, ∀ i, j.
Additivity is satisﬁed by construct in the dataset, homogeneity and symmetry must
be imposed and tested for.
The demands and the preference structure for the representative household can
be derived from the structure of the AIDS by the transformations presented below.
Diﬀerentiating the expenditure function, given by equation (25), with respect to price
gives the Hicksian (compensated) demands.
xhi =
∂c{u, p}
∂pi
=
(
∂a{p}
∂pi
+
∂b{p}
∂pi
)
exp (a{p}+ b{p}) (28)
where the partial derivatives (29) and (30) are given by diﬀerentiating (23) and (24),
∂a{p}
∂pi
=
αi
pi
+
1
pi
n∑
i=1
γ∗ij + γ
∗
ji
2
ln pi =
αi +
∑n
i=1 γij ln pi
pi
(29)
∂b{p}
∂pi
=
β0
∏n
k=1 p
βk
k
pi
=
b{p}
pi
(30)
By substitution, equation (28) can be re-written more compactly as: xhi =
wi
pi
c{u, p},
this serves as a consistency check on this equation. The compensated price elastici-
ties are derived by diﬀerentiating the Hicksian demands with respect to prices and
substituting in uβ0
∏n
k=1 p
βk
k = ln(m/P ),
ehij =
∂xhi
∂pj
pj
xhi
=
(
wiwj + γij + βiβj ln
(
m
P
))
1
wi
− δij (31)
where δij = 1 if i = j and δij = 0 if i = j.
The Marshallian demands are derived using Roy’s Identity xi =
−∂V/∂pi
∂V/∂m
. Dif-
ferentiating the indirect utility function (26) produces ∂V (p,m)/∂mt = 1/mtb{p} and
∂V (p,m)/∂pt,i =
(
αi +
∑n
j=1 γij ln pi + βi (lnm− a{p})
)
/ (−pib{p}). The Marshallian
demand for good i is given by the ratio of these two derivatives,
xt,i =
−∂V/∂pi,t
∂V/mt
=
m
pi

αi + n∑
j=1
γij ln pi + βi ln
(
m
P
) (32)
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As a consistency check, see that equation (32) can be expressed more compactly as
xt,i = (wt,i/pt,i)mt, which is clearly correct.
The income elasticity of demand is given by diﬀerentiating the Marshallian demand
with respect to income:
emit =
∂xit
∂mt
mt
xit
= 1 + βi/wit (33)
Equation (33) corresponds to the formulation for income elasticity reported in Anderson
and Blundell (1983), table I.
D Relative Risk Aversion.
The parameter estimates of the AIDS cannot be used to “pin” down consumer’s atti-
tudes to risk with respect to income eﬀects. This is because the indirect utility function,
speciﬁed by equation (26), depends on cardinal properties of preferences. This means
that the direct utility function can undergo any monotonic transformation and still
be a valid representation of preferences. For example, equation (22) can be re-written
as ln c{u, p} = a{p} + f{u}b{p} where df{u}/du > 0. This also implies that a valid
transformation for equation (26) is V {p,m} = f−1
{
lnm−a{p}
b{p}
}
. In order to compute
general case for the Arrow-Pratt measures of ARA and RRA, one needs the derivatives
of the indirect utility function, subject to the transformation f{.}, these give,
dV (p,m)
dmt
=
∂f−1
{
lnm−a{p}
b{p}
}
∂mt
1
mtb{p}
d2V (p,m)
(dmt)2
=
∂2f−1
{
lnm−a{p}
b{p}
}
(∂mt)2
1
m2t b{p}2
−
∂f−1
{
lnm−a{p}
b{p}
}
∂mt
1
m2t b{p}
The ratio of these two partial derivatives gives the Arrow-Pratt measures of absolute
risk aversion (ARA) and relative risk aversion (RRA) for the AIDS,
ARA =
−d2V/dm2t
dV/dmt
=

1− ∂2f−1
{
lnm−a{p}
b{p}
}
(∂mt)2
÷
∂f−1
{
lnm−a{p}
b{p}
}
∂mt
b{p}

 1
mt
(34)
RRA = 1−
∂2f−1
{
lnm−a{p}
b{p}
}
(∂mt)2
÷
∂f−1
{
lnm−a{p}
b{p}
}
∂mt
b{p} (35)
Given these diﬃculties, the simple strategy of calibrating the model so that RRA = 1
is used. A constant coeﬃcient of RRA implies that agents’ risk aversion is proportional
to their wealth and much of the literature suggest a range of 1
2
< RRA < 2, see Siegel
and Hoban (1982), Choi and Menezes (1985), Szpiro (1986) and Gollier et al. (1997)
for evidence of this. Calibrating the coeﬃcient of RRA to equal one seems a reasonable
compromise. Diﬀerent values of RRA simply alter the value of the component πie in
equation (6) by a scalar multiplicative term.
E Parameter Estimates for the AIDS.
Parameter estimates for equation (27) are repored in Table C, these are the values for
the α’s, β’s and γ’s. These parameter estimates are used to generate the preference
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structure of the representative household reported in Table (2). To avoid the prob-
lem of collinearity between the equations, the system is estimated using just the ﬁrst
37 equations. Parameters for the 38th equation are calculated using the property of
additivity reported in Appendix C.
The restrictions of Homogeneity and Symmetry are rejected both individually and
jointly. Rejection of the the joint hypothesis of homogeneity and symmetry is strong
with F (703, 3700) = 9.87 for the test. Despite this, these restrictions are imposed
(using parameter estimates of the unrestricted AIDS did not substantially alter the ﬁnal
estimates of the PARP). Rejection of the hypotheses of homogeneity and symmetry
may arise for any number of reasons, such as measurement error, aggregation over
households or aggregation over products. However, in this case the most likely reason
for rejection arises from the non-stationary nature of the data. Most estimates of
aggregate AIDS’s typically are for systems with just 4 or 5 product categories (rather
than the 38 used here) and use seasonally adjusted data. Using seasonally adjusted data
permits the use of the Fully Modiﬁed Least Squares Estimator of Phillips and Hansen
(1990) to remove the bias arising from non-stationarity. However, seasonal adjustment
can aﬀect parameter estimates. Attempts at estimating this demand system using
seasonally adjusted data lead to parameter estimates that often implied the existence
of positive compensated own price elasticities.
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Dependent variable: Expenditure share (wi).
w1.1 w1.2 w1.3 w1.4 w1.5 w1.6 w1.7 w1.8 w1.9 w1.10 w1.11 w1.12 w1.13 w2.1 w2.2 w2.3 w2.4 w2.5 w3.1
Parameter estimates, (γij ’s, βi’s and αi’s).
ln p1.1 -0.021 0.003 -0.010 -0.003 0.002 0.003 -0.000 0.007 -0.001 -0.011 -0.000 0.002 -0.000 -0.012 -0.002 0.008 -0.005 0.010 -0.023
ln p1.2 0.003 -0.065 -0.000 0.005 -0.003 0.005 -0.002 0.008 -0.005 -0.006 -0.003 0.013 0.006 -0.033 0.007 0.025 -0.000 0.001 -0.002
ln p1.3 -0.010 -0.000 -0.014 -0.007 0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.002 0.000 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.003 0.004 0.003 0.010 -0.000 0.000 0.012
ln p1.4 -0.003 0.005 -0.007 -0.012 0.004 0.002 0.000 0.005 0.001 -0.003 -0.002 0.003 -0.011 -0.014 0.031 0.008 -0.004 -0.009 -0.010
ln p1.5 0.002 -0.003 0.001 0.004 -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.000 0.001 -0.000 0.001 -0.008
ln p1.6 0.003 0.005 0.001 0.002 0.001 -0.011 -0.002 0.007 -0.001 -0.003 0.000 0.004 0.000 -0.003 0.015 -0.005 -0.001 0.004 -0.006
ln p1.7 -0.000 -0.002 -0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.002 -0.004 0.003 -0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 -0.000 0.003 -0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.004 0.001
ln p1.8 0.007 0.008 -0.002 0.005 0.000 0.007 0.003 -0.005 0.000 -0.013 0.001 0.009 0.001 0.005 0.003 -0.007 0.000 0.010 -0.013
ln p1.9 -0.001 -0.005 0.000 0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.000 0.000 -0.002 0.000 -0.000 0.001 0.001 -0.002 0.002 0.003 0.000 -0.001 -0.004
ln p1.10 -0.011 -0.006 -0.002 -0.003 0.001 -0.003 0.001 -0.013 0.000 0.012 0.001 -0.003 -0.005 0.012 0.022 0.003 -0.001 -0.013 0.014
ln p1.11 -0.000 -0.003 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 -0.000 0.001 -0.004 0.001 -0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002
ln p1.12 0.002 0.013 -0.001 0.003 0.002 0.004 0.001 0.009 0.001 -0.003 0.001 -0.005 0.001 0.012 0.003 0.001 -0.004 0.004 -0.011
ln p1.13 -0.000 0.006 -0.003 -0.011 -0.002 0.000 -0.000 0.001 0.001 -0.005 -0.001 0.001 -0.009 -0.006 0.012 -0.000 0.000 0.002 0.008
ln p2.1 -0.012 -0.033 0.004 -0.014 -0.002 -0.003 0.003 0.005 -0.002 0.012 0.002 0.012 -0.006 -0.017 0.039 0.016 -0.006 -0.070 0.002
ln p2.2 -0.002 0.007 0.003 0.031 -0.000 0.015 -0.000 0.003 0.002 0.022 -0.001 0.003 0.012 0.039 -0.124 -0.018 0.007 0.021 0.003
ln p2.3 0.008 0.025 0.010 0.008 0.001 -0.005 0.001 -0.007 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.001 -0.000 0.016 -0.018 -0.034 -0.001 0.010 -0.004
ln p2.4 -0.005 -0.000 -0.000 -0.004 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.004 0.000 -0.006 0.007 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 0.002
ln p2.5 0.010 0.001 0.000 -0.009 0.001 0.004 0.004 0.010 -0.001 -0.013 -0.001 0.004 0.002 -0.070 0.021 0.010 -0.000 0.008 0.007
ln p3.1 -0.023 -0.002 0.012 -0.010 -0.008 -0.006 0.001 -0.013 -0.004 0.014 -0.002 -0.011 0.008 0.002 0.003 -0.004 0.002 0.007 0.038
ln p3.2 0.017 0.018 0.017 0.031 0.009 -0.005 0.004 -0.006 0.007 0.014 0.015 0.001 0.004 0.009 -0.009 -0.045 0.001 0.025 -0.001
ln p3.3 0.013 0.003 0.001 0.006 0.002 0.001 -0.002 0.000 0.001 -0.009 0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.009 -0.004 -0.009 0.000 0.012 -0.021
ln p4.1 -0.013 0.003 -0.010 -0.006 0.002 -0.002 0.002 -0.011 0.001 0.004 0.001 -0.009 -0.005 -0.034 0.050 0.026 0.003 -0.009 0.007
ln p4.2 0.001 0.009 -0.002 -0.003 -0.000 0.002 0.001 0.002 -0.000 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.001 0.006 0.007 0.001 -0.011 -0.002
ln p5.1 0.004 0.001 -0.005 -0.003 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.005 -0.002 0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.018
ln p5.2 0.006 -0.007 0.006 -0.004 -0.005 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.002 -0.007 -0.002 -0.001 -0.003 -0.009 -0.002 0.003 0.004 0.020 0.026
ln p5.3 0.010 0.003 -0.003 0.005 -0.001 0.003 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.007 -0.004 -0.002 0.001 0.013 -0.011 0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.013
ln p5.4 0.009 0.010 0.003 -0.014 0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.003 0.002 0.004 -0.000 -0.002 -0.003 0.013 -0.005 0.013 0.000 -0.004 -0.000
ln p6.1 -0.007 -0.008 0.003 -0.005 -0.003 -0.004 -0.000 -0.009 -0.001 0.012 0.000 -0.003 -0.003 0.009 -0.002 0.004 0.001 -0.010 0.026
ln p6.2 -0.010 -0.014 -0.007 -0.003 -0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.003 -0.002 -0.006 -0.003 -0.002 -0.000 0.015 0.003 0.005 -0.002 -0.006 0.003
ln p6.3 0.002 -0.003 -0.001 0.002 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.002 0.001 0.001 0.004 0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.007
ln p7.1 0.004 0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.002 -0.000 -0.000 0.003 0.001
ln p7.2 0.007 0.004 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.003 -0.007 0.001 -0.001 -0.011
ln p7.3 0.004 0.003 0.005 -0.007 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.008 0.001 -0.004 0.005 0.002 -0.002 -0.008 0.004 0.002 0.007
ln p8.1 0.008 0.009 0.006 0.011 0.000 -0.003 0.001 -0.003 0.001 0.002 0.004 -0.000 0.005 0.003 -0.004 -0.010 -0.000 0.004 -0.011
ln p8.2 -0.001 0.004 0.003 -0.002 0.001 -0.006 -0.002 -0.002 0.000 -0.000 0.002 -0.001 -0.002 0.011 -0.016 -0.002 -0.001 0.001 0.005
ln p8.3 0.010 0.004 -0.004 0.017 0.003 -0.001 0.001 0.006 0.001 0.000 0.004 0.001 0.001 0.038 -0.026 -0.003 0.001 0.002 -0.014
ln p8.4 -0.001 0.002 0.002 -0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.002 -0.004 -0.001 0.001 0.002 -0.003 0.001 -0.002 -0.002 0.002 -0.001
ln p8.5 -0.008 0.001 -0.002 -0.008 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.007 -0.001 -0.007 0.003 0.008 -0.003 0.009 0.009 -0.013 0.016
ln m
P
-0.018 -0.018 -0.011 -0.024 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.000 -0.005 -0.009 -0.009 -0.018 0.042 0.031 -0.003 -0.011 0.018
const. 0.169 0.205 0.092 0.215 0.025 0.025 0.020 0.039 0.011 0.027 0.047 0.087 0.079 0.216 -0.280 -0.207 0.025 0.142 -0.094
t-statistics
ln p1.1 -2.500 0.380 -1.706 -0.310 0.800 0.434 -0.240 0.129 -0.268 -2.198 -0.041 0.381 -0.095 -2.115 -0.139 11.452 -0.433 0.125 -0.437
ln p1.2 0.134 -35.453 -0.027 2.068 -0.098 2.515 -0.569 0.716 -2.302 -1.372 -3.104 1.839 0.832 -3.015 0.672 4.682 -0.112 0.030 -0.101
ln p1.3 -1.403 -0.030 -11.348 -0.610 0.028 0.033 -0.508 -1.819 0.033 -1.563 -0.394 -0.140 -0.143 1.909 0.166 6.367 -0.002 0.008 0.253
ln p1.4 -0.190 0.802 -0.775 -3.009 0.564 0.337 0.017 1.161 0.219 -3.833 -0.426 1.611 -1.773 -1.264 15.121 1.146 -0.115 -0.150 -0.477
ln p1.5 0.733 -0.242 0.234 0.100 -0.608 0.090 0.015 0.075 0.506 0.754 -0.112 0.348 -0.127 -0.317 -0.003 0.539 -0.028 0.048 -0.031
ln p1.6 0.230 3.710 0.046 0.072 0.082 -1.665 -6.015 2.114 -0.769 -0.835 0.017 0.266 0.136 -0.213 3.386 -0.200 -0.429 0.069 -0.110
ln p1.7 -0.038 -0.190 -0.181 0.025 0.008 -0.026 -2.474 0.989 -0.654 0.109 0.085 0.117 -0.017 2.178 -0.015 0.025 -0.038 0.148 0.251
ln p1.8 0.393 2.798 -0.042 1.911 0.012 0.409 4.061 -1.880 0.519 -1.563 0.376 1.059 0.121 0.391 0.374 -0.985 0.022 0.035 -0.620
ln p1.9 -0.632 -0.412 0.003 0.027 0.196 -0.471 -0.300 0.530 -0.853 0.052 -0.024 0.329 0.048 -0.602 0.026 1.786 0.005 -0.018 -0.336
ln p1.10 -0.746 -1.312 -0.199 -0.276 0.016 -0.444 0.732 -29.667 0.125 5.268 0.254 -0.287 -2.699 0.760 0.373 0.180 -0.134 -2.355 0.968
ln p1.11 -0.005 -0.073 -0.344 -0.090 -0.044 0.033 0.178 1.263 -0.045 0.252 -0.753 0.108 -0.080 0.352 -0.056 0.261 -0.005 -0.041 -0.126
ln p1.12 0.102 0.353 -0.041 0.314 1.255 0.940 1.816 4.204 0.100 -0.313 0.634 -0.507 0.195 0.216 0.669 0.104 -0.180 0.331 -0.897
ln p1.13 -0.047 0.480 -0.293 -0.099 -0.232 0.074 -1.443 0.260 0.491 -1.999 -0.191 0.578 -0.539 -0.126 0.267 -0.066 0.020 0.127 1.873
ln p2.1 -0.170 -10.584 0.183 -0.615 -0.746 -0.772 11.563 0.892 -0.537 2.684 0.523 1.338 -0.970 -1.120 2.117 0.229 -0.585 -4.396 0.797
ln p2.2 -0.037 0.245 0.278 14.043 -0.012 11.053 -0.434 0.462 0.170 24.521 -0.179 1.282 0.191 10.197 -3.184 -1.219 1.392 1.561 0.666
ln p2.3 0.429 2.178 0.083 0.823 0.307 -7.935 0.417 -4.911 0.979 0.614 2.323 0.115 -0.009 0.481 -1.007 -24.547 -0.166 2.107 -0.342
ln p2.4 -1.010 -0.017 -0.003 -0.738 -0.087 -0.866 -0.563 0.099 0.017 -0.425 -0.110 -0.995 0.003 -0.411 0.034 -0.172 -0.125 -0.198 0.128
ln p2.5 0.232 0.072 0.024 -1.340 0.914 1.131 1.978 1.359 -0.831 -2.340 -0.642 0.089 0.492 -2.342 0.491 3.224 -0.087 1.672 0.296
ln p3.1 -1.316 -0.018 1.115 -1.569 -11.901 -0.969 2.641 -6.862 -0.565 22.256 -0.245 -0.304 0.219 0.123 0.727 -0.833 1.194 0.617 1.436
ln p3.2 0.465 0.670 3.139 5.665 6.655 -0.722 1.692 -1.526 1.668 3.020 6.186 0.086 0.276 0.061 -0.477 -11.019 1.045 1.250 -0.170
ln p3.3 0.729 1.321 0.173 2.900 0.671 0.149 -0.228 0.463 0.074 -6.424 0.026 -0.663 -0.033 -0.281 -0.442 -2.735 0.228 0.459 -2.692
ln p4.1 -0.068 0.308 -1.385 -6.129 0.361 -0.880 1.113 -2.746 1.139 0.681 0.070 -0.338 -0.356 -11.308 4.172 21.139 0.541 -0.302 0.306
ln p4.2 0.028 1.676 -0.330 -1.332 -0.061 2.860 0.137 0.773 -0.018 -1.239 -0.217 -0.216 -0.017 -0.101 0.537 11.903 0.103 -1.472 -0.334
ln p5.1 1.086 0.170 -2.282 -0.678 -0.067 0.280 -1.077 0.302 -0.705 -0.214 -1.083 0.048 0.014 0.024 -0.005 1.139 -0.091 -0.043 -1.387
ln p5.2 0.355 -0.923 5.351 -0.456 -2.497 1.785 0.201 5.391 0.268 -0.380 -0.133 -0.094 -0.966 -0.960 -0.424 1.107 0.305 0.604 10.365
ln p5.3 1.154 0.440 -1.428 0.432 -0.422 2.866 -0.319 0.346 -0.480 1.096 -0.655 -0.017 0.099 1.510 -6.136 0.476 -0.939 -0.260 -0.988
ln p5.4 0.737 4.615 0.676 -1.135 0.044 -0.782 -0.214 -2.516 0.062 2.588 -0.020 -0.061 -0.420 1.712 -1.482 1.830 0.012 -0.235 -0.020
ln p6.1 -0.650 -7.004 0.339 -1.686 -1.189 -2.946 -0.654 -1.707 -0.054 0.920 0.016 -1.401 -0.253 3.152 -0.280 0.455 0.037 -2.755 1.697
ln p6.2 -1.035 -6.300 -0.577 -0.822 -0.100 1.961 -0.214 1.521 -0.188 -1.007 -0.047 -0.175 -0.003 11.389 0.219 2.351 -0.167 -0.357 1.796
ln p6.3 0.708 -0.508 -0.052 0.195 -0.952 -0.010 -0.263 0.012 -0.124 -0.034 -0.122 0.235 0.126 1.418 0.056 -0.421 -0.029 -0.127 -0.533
ln p7.1 2.493 0.249 -0.459 -0.461 -0.182 0.551 0.028 0.037 -0.000 -0.128 -0.533 -0.196 0.181 0.199 -0.076 -0.009 -0.092 0.126 0.231
ln p7.2 1.969 0.327 0.013 0.088 -0.271 0.610 -0.430 -0.012 -0.080 -0.034 -0.092 -0.182 0.918 0.009 0.473 -1.805 0.040 -0.217 -0.586
ln p7.3 0.457 0.247 0.347 -6.849 -0.294 -3.880 -0.028 0.025 0.008 -0.603 0.454 -0.601 1.738 0.135 -0.769 -1.013 0.304 0.091 1.232
ln p8.1 0.518 2.720 1.394 1.920 0.538 -1.551 0.036 -0.273 0.169 2.038 1.045 -0.108 0.682 0.156 -0.406 -6.003 -0.001 0.807 -0.162
ln p8.2 -0.045 0.781 0.310 -0.501 0.141 -10.797 -0.447 -0.483 0.003 -0.006 0.463 -1.210 -0.129 2.603 -5.858 -0.278 -0.298 0.037 0.103
ln p8.3 0.451 0.250 -2.289 2.605 1.552 -0.165 0.476 0.564 0.044 0.148 1.015 0.362 0.070 4.352 -5.137 -0.621 0.064 0.294 -0.779
ln p8.4 -0.164 0.519 0.239 -1.486 0.126 0.275 -0.093 0.006 -0.998 -1.138 -0.922 0.131 0.130 -0.099 0.728 -0.238 -0.277 0.023 -0.325
ln p8.5 -1.501 0.083 -0.342 -1.473 -0.135 -0.152 -0.281 -0.024 -0.043 -2.037 -0.950 -0.810 0.762 1.025 -0.536 7.783 0.319 -0.192 0.426
ln m
P
-1.034 -10.762 -1.100 -14.689 -0.084 -2.320 -0.100 -0.182 -0.302 -0.162 -4.084 -0.754 -1.373 -1.248 11.938 3.735 -0.295 -0.450 1.105
const. 35.579 23.081 79.391 28.350 1.117 6.826 4.424 37.652 2.080 25.350 15.592 6.652 3.827 74.406 -44.897 -85.641 0.244 23.423 -2.767
R2i 0.934 0.925 0.827 0.961 0.978 0.445 0.419 0.720 0.989 0.577 0.948 0.874 0.670 0.683 0.477 0.900 0.820 0.964 0.842
σˆi 0.001 0.004 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.010 0.008 0.003 0.001 0.006 0.003
Almost Ideal Demand System estimated by Ordinary Least Squares, restricted for homogeneity
(37 restrictions) and symmetry (666 restrictions). Restrictions rejected individually and jointly.
Table C: AIDS estimated by OLS.
Dependent variable: Expenditure share (wi).
w3.2 w3.3 w4.1 w4.2 w5.1 w5.2 w5.3 w5.4 w6.1 w6.2 w6.3 w7.1 w7.2 w7.3 w8.1 w8.2 w8.3 w8.4 w8.5
Parameter estimates, (γij ’s, βi’s and αi’s).
0.017 0.013 -0.013 0.001 0.004 0.006 0.010 0.009 -0.007 -0.010 0.002 0.004 0.007 0.004 0.008 -0.001 0.010 -0.001 -0.008 ln p1.1
0.018 0.003 0.003 0.009 0.001 -0.007 0.003 0.010 -0.008 -0.014 -0.003 0.002 0.004 0.003 0.009 0.004 0.004 0.002 0.001 ln p1.2
0.017 0.001 -0.010 -0.002 -0.005 0.006 -0.003 0.003 0.003 -0.007 -0.001 -0.002 0.000 0.005 0.006 0.003 -0.004 0.002 -0.002 ln p1.3
0.031 0.006 -0.006 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 0.005 -0.014 -0.005 -0.003 0.002 -0.001 0.000 -0.007 0.011 -0.002 0.017 -0.001 -0.008 ln p1.4
0.009 0.002 0.002 -0.000 -0.001 -0.005 -0.001 0.000 -0.003 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 0.000 0.001 0.003 0.001 -0.000 ln p1.5
-0.005 0.001 -0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.003 -0.000 -0.004 0.002 -0.000 0.000 0.001 -0.001 -0.003 -0.006 -0.001 0.001 -0.000 ln p1.6
0.004 -0.002 0.002 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.002 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 ln p1.7
-0.006 0.000 -0.011 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.001 -0.003 -0.009 0.003 0.000 0.001 -0.000 0.000 -0.003 -0.002 0.006 0.000 -0.001 ln p1.8
0.007 0.001 0.001 -0.000 -0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 -0.002 -0.000 ln p1.9
0.014 -0.009 0.004 -0.003 -0.005 -0.007 0.007 0.004 0.012 -0.006 -0.000 -0.001 -0.002 -0.008 0.002 -0.000 0.000 -0.004 -0.007 ln p1.10
0.015 0.001 0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.004 -0.000 0.000 -0.003 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.004 0.002 0.004 -0.001 -0.001 ln p1.11
0.001 -0.002 -0.009 -0.002 0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.004 -0.000 -0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.007 ln p1.12
0.004 -0.001 -0.005 -0.003 0.000 -0.003 0.001 -0.003 -0.003 -0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.005 0.005 -0.002 0.001 0.002 0.003 ln p1.13
0.009 -0.009 -0.034 -0.001 0.000 -0.009 0.013 0.013 0.009 0.015 0.004 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.003 0.011 0.038 -0.003 0.008 ln p2.1
-0.009 -0.004 0.050 0.006 -0.000 -0.002 -0.011 -0.005 -0.002 0.003 0.001 -0.002 0.003 -0.002 -0.004 -0.016 -0.026 0.001 -0.003 ln p2.2
-0.045 -0.009 0.026 0.007 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.013 0.004 0.005 -0.002 -0.000 -0.007 -0.008 -0.010 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 0.009 ln p2.3
0.001 0.000 0.003 0.001 -0.001 0.004 -0.003 0.000 0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.000 0.001 0.004 -0.000 -0.001 0.001 -0.002 0.009 ln p2.4
0.025 0.012 -0.009 -0.011 -0.000 0.020 -0.002 -0.004 -0.010 -0.006 -0.002 0.003 -0.001 0.002 0.004 0.001 0.002 0.002 -0.013 ln p2.5
-0.001 -0.021 0.007 -0.002 -0.018 0.026 -0.013 -0.000 0.026 0.003 -0.007 0.001 -0.011 0.007 -0.011 0.005 -0.014 -0.001 0.016 ln p3.1
-0.153 0.003 0.030 0.013 0.025 -0.005 0.028 -0.003 -0.005 0.038 0.012 0.002 -0.005 -0.025 -0.031 0.001 -0.014 -0.006 -0.012 ln p3.2
0.003 -0.008 0.006 0.002 0.005 0.007 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 0.004 0.002 -0.000 -0.002 -0.009 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.001 0.008 ln p3.3
0.030 0.006 -0.017 -0.003 -0.006 -0.015 -0.011 0.003 0.006 -0.006 -0.003 -0.004 0.001 -0.001 0.008 0.010 -0.001 -0.003 0.002 ln p4.1
0.013 0.002 -0.003 -0.017 -0.000 -0.009 -0.001 -0.009 0.001 0.002 0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.003 0.008 -0.001 0.003 0.001 0.010 ln p4.2
0.025 0.005 -0.006 -0.000 -0.004 0.002 0.003 -0.003 -0.000 -0.008 -0.000 0.001 0.007 0.004 0.007 -0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.006 ln p5.1
-0.005 0.007 -0.015 -0.009 0.002 -0.029 0.003 -0.011 0.009 0.009 -0.000 -0.001 0.003 -0.005 -0.000 0.008 0.001 0.006 -0.004 ln p5.2
0.028 -0.004 -0.011 -0.001 0.003 0.003 -0.027 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 0.007 0.008 0.001 0.002 -0.000 -0.001 ln p5.3
-0.003 -0.003 0.003 -0.009 -0.003 -0.011 -0.002 -0.004 0.007 -0.005 -0.005 -0.001 -0.002 0.018 0.004 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.005 ln p5.4
-0.005 -0.003 0.006 0.001 -0.000 0.009 -0.003 0.007 0.002 0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 0.002 -0.000 0.001 -0.008 -0.002 -0.004 ln p6.1
0.038 0.004 -0.006 0.002 -0.008 0.009 -0.003 -0.005 0.002 -0.014 -0.004 -0.003 0.001 0.005 0.008 0.002 0.005 -0.002 -0.005 ln p6.2
0.012 0.002 -0.003 0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.005 -0.002 -0.004 -0.002 0.001 -0.001 0.007 0.003 0.000 0.002 -0.001 -0.002 ln p6.3
0.002 -0.000 -0.004 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.003 0.001 -0.001 0.002 0.004 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 0.001 0.000 ln p7.1
-0.005 -0.002 0.001 0.001 0.007 0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.002 -0.002 0.002 -0.003 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.007 ln p7.2
-0.025 -0.009 -0.001 0.003 0.004 -0.005 0.007 0.018 0.002 0.005 0.007 0.004 0.002 -0.001 -0.004 -0.004 -0.010 0.003 -0.000 ln p7.3
-0.031 0.002 0.008 0.008 0.007 -0.000 0.008 0.004 -0.000 0.008 0.003 -0.001 -0.003 -0.004 -0.026 -0.000 -0.011 0.003 0.002 ln p8.1
0.001 0.002 0.010 -0.001 -0.001 0.008 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.000 -0.000 0.001 -0.004 -0.000 -0.012 -0.005 0.001 0.004 ln p8.2
-0.014 0.003 -0.001 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.002 -0.001 -0.008 0.005 0.002 -0.000 0.000 -0.010 -0.011 -0.005 -0.012 0.001 0.004 ln p8.3
-0.006 0.001 -0.003 0.001 0.001 0.006 -0.000 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 ln p8.4
-0.012 0.008 0.002 0.010 -0.006 -0.004 -0.001 -0.005 -0.004 -0.005 -0.002 0.000 0.007 -0.000 0.002 0.004 0.004 0.001 0.009 ln p8.5
0.079 0.004 -0.022 -0.025 -0.013 -0.009 -0.007 0.001 0.008 -0.015 -0.005 -0.003 0.004 0.013 0.020 0.005 0.016 -0.003 -0.005 ln m
P
-0.507 -0.004 0.251 0.248 0.110 0.096 0.068 0.013 -0.053 0.124 0.041 0.027 -0.017 -0.064 -0.126 -0.021 -0.106 0.027 0.053 const.
t-statistics
1.120 6.083 -3.868 0.427 0.516 0.339 0.886 5.922 -0.759 -6.568 0.042 0.710 0.244 0.282 1.581 -0.186 4.429 -0.143 ln p1.1
0.101 0.352 1.057 7.326 0.090 -1.483 0.863 1.389 -6.813 -2.052 -0.060 0.046 0.320 2.699 1.478 2.412 0.785 0.347 ln p1.2
0.453 0.266 -3.480 -0.721 -0.256 0.467 -0.504 0.682 0.362 -2.895 -0.043 -0.070 0.000 0.914 0.946 3.061 -0.414 1.188 ln p1.3
8.969 0.928 -5.964 -0.427 -0.157 -0.107 3.994 -1.590 -2.176 -0.106 0.496 -0.028 0.016 -2.583 2.029 -1.088 1.429 -0.057 ln p1.4
0.560 0.346 4.075 -0.040 -0.104 -0.501 -0.227 0.444 -0.304 -0.028 -0.031 -0.050 -0.366 -0.519 0.222 0.203 0.199 0.016 ln p1.5
-0.702 0.244 -1.822 0.141 0.085 0.057 0.820 -0.025 -0.959 0.240 -0.001 0.000 0.060 -0.378 -2.834 -0.863 -0.307 0.077 ln p1.6
0.367 -0.857 0.902 0.032 -0.036 0.199 -0.113 -0.448 -0.009 -0.497 -0.010 0.003 -0.121 -0.174 0.282 -0.245 0.229 -0.032 ln p1.7
-0.566 0.387 -2.518 0.499 0.221 0.144 1.613 -0.282 -0.288 0.184 0.016 0.120 -0.007 0.029 -0.692 -0.223 0.693 0.005 ln p1.8
0.845 0.299 0.179 -0.014 -0.110 0.174 -0.225 0.574 -0.123 -0.259 -0.002 -0.000 -0.076 0.227 0.161 0.114 0.341 -0.050 ln p1.9
4.565 -1.952 0.693 -0.104 -2.028 -0.285 3.697 0.108 4.531 -0.432 -0.013 -0.067 -0.299 -6.764 0.233 -0.006 0.091 -0.182 ln p1.10
10.035 0.089 0.931 -0.216 -0.155 -0.754 -0.500 -0.010 0.004 -0.554 -0.592 -0.053 -0.230 0.529 0.379 0.119 3.952 -0.029 ln p1.11
0.331 -0.193 -1.379 -0.174 0.133 -0.049 -0.694 -0.153 -0.331 -0.028 0.090 -0.103 -1.023 -0.735 -0.078 -0.279 0.170 0.143 ln p1.12
0.569 -0.095 -0.265 -1.046 0.034 -0.540 0.048 -1.248 -0.118 -0.002 0.148 0.047 0.514 0.822 1.152 -0.186 0.372 0.068 ln p1.13
0.706 -3.133 -6.142 -0.098 0.096 -0.318 0.558 0.583 0.877 11.283 0.420 0.313 0.016 0.294 0.203 6.336 7.086 -0.269 ln p2.1
-0.496 -1.589 4.667 0.660 -0.004 -0.162 -1.280 -0.585 -0.022 0.544 0.123 -0.818 0.242 -1.359 -1.071 -1.745 -41.761 0.016 ln p2.2
-2.379 -1.241 12.358 0.437 0.396 0.033 1.212 0.665 0.153 1.521 -0.269 -0.031 -0.525 -1.723 -1.381 -0.379 -0.734 -0.147 ln p2.3
0.207 0.211 0.229 0.439 -0.058 0.047 -0.155 0.017 0.627 -0.423 -0.212 -0.036 0.051 0.290 -0.023 -0.079 0.985 -0.010 ln p2.4
5.582 3.006 -1.200 -0.761 -0.080 0.729 -0.310 -0.042 -0.982 -1.639 -1.157 0.153 -0.137 0.417 0.601 0.749 0.392 0.016 ln p2.5
-0.081 -25.243 0.552 -0.531 -0.285 3.890 -0.799 -0.009 5.387 0.978 -2.559 0.038 -3.761 0.962 -2.189 0.574 -6.427 -0.031 ln p3.1
39.011 0.775 19.732 0.676 0.510 -0.088 3.799 -1.295 -0.759 31.643 1.803 0.063 -0.547 -15.873 -3.662 0.250 -0.617 -0.553 ln p3.2
0.434 -2.950 0.535 0.244 0.285 0.285 -0.043 -0.288 -0.466 6.333 0.165 -0.014 -0.943 -1.098 1.747 0.151 0.160 0.012 ln p3.3
19.914 1.211 -5.213 -0.041 -1.445 -0.283 -0.622 0.658 1.133 -4.980 -0.174 -0.560 0.300 -0.145 1.107 2.318 -0.128 -0.070 ln p4.1
1.688 2.759 -0.188 -0.307 -0.006 -0.395 -0.885 -1.587 0.462 0.534 0.032 -0.073 1.090 0.266 3.666 -0.027 2.178 0.006 ln p4.2
4.695 1.101 -1.176 -0.011 -0.245 0.007 0.346 -0.522 -0.406 -1.557 -0.035 0.177 1.375 3.787 0.675 -0.021 0.083 0.018 ln p5.1
-0.568 5.683 -0.268 -1.993 0.062 -0.511 0.850 -2.297 4.467 1.330 -0.026 -0.102 0.799 -0.598 -0.101 0.695 0.106 0.013 ln p5.2
26.316 -0.615 -0.252 -0.035 0.175 0.591 -5.423 -0.866 -0.580 -0.429 -0.039 -0.515 -0.332 3.042 0.233 0.227 0.129 -0.005 ln p5.3
-0.320 -1.309 0.195 -0.541 -0.018 -0.460 -0.313 -4.704 0.885 -2.927 -0.590 -0.125 -2.471 1.645 0.138 0.038 -0.186 -0.071 ln p5.4
-2.175 -0.142 1.629 0.024 -0.011 0.734 -0.664 4.088 0.186 0.360 -0.091 -0.228 -0.228 0.548 -0.019 0.087 -0.137 -0.052 ln p6.1
3.549 0.226 -0.185 0.091 -2.406 0.555 -2.149 -1.293 0.205 -0.678 -1.282 -0.230 0.529 0.135 3.522 0.084 0.401 -0.097 ln p6.2
3.290 0.339 -0.197 0.003 -0.010 -0.017 -1.716 -0.698 -0.513 -0.743 -0.107 0.865 -0.149 0.233 0.146 0.000 1.448 -0.040 ln p6.3
0.042 -0.062 -0.123 -0.036 0.130 -0.082 -0.717 -0.136 -0.556 -0.259 0.108 -0.073 0.875 0.405 -0.119 -0.003 -0.089 0.052 ln p7.1
-0.155 -0.181 0.105 0.268 0.658 0.539 -0.528 -0.149 -0.122 0.329 -0.047 0.614 -0.086 0.767 -0.136 0.039 0.081 0.047 ln p7.2
-2.352 -1.687 -0.005 0.147 0.429 -2.099 1.141 6.608 0.797 0.462 3.011 0.295 0.111 -0.034 -0.461 -1.573 -2.610 0.350 ln p7.3
11.798 0.156 0.261 0.911 0.814 -0.069 0.999 0.796 -0.037 1.078 0.172 -0.209 -0.393 -0.398 -0.277 -0.041 -3.109 0.777 ln p8.1
0.029 0.367 3.287 -0.104 -0.248 0.731 0.075 0.068 0.979 0.142 0.001 -0.007 0.603 -0.179 -0.022 -2.206 -1.592 0.181 ln p8.2
-1.471 0.050 -0.059 0.304 0.775 0.030 0.673 -0.246 -1.665 3.232 0.073 -0.012 0.016 -1.005 -5.901 -0.667 -10.645 0.068 ln p8.3
-0.311 0.101 -0.447 0.061 0.240 0.222 -0.111 -0.080 -0.619 -0.166 -0.133 0.095 0.179 0.026 0.357 0.211 2.452 0.014 ln p8.4
-1.249 7.526 0.230 2.881 -0.835 -0.140 -0.095 -3.405 -0.599 -1.548 -0.019 0.109 0.528 -0.011 0.420 0.663 3.634 0.027 ln p8.5
0.757 0.724 -2.589 -14.984 -1.050 -1.163 -1.920 0.127 12.040 -0.921 -0.068 -0.095 0.629 6.023 3.487 2.267 6.149 -0.063 ln m
P
23.297 -1.683 34.766 72.978 6.682 26.206 9.410 2.353 -10.240 23.055 1.737 2.016 -0.274 -6.623 -22.613 -20.177 -23.024 2.128 const.
0.940 0.593 -0.016 0.800 0.900 0.921 0.849 0.507 0.529 0.966 0.940 0.982 0.923 0.966 0.937 0.495 0.798 0.744 R2i
0.005 0.002 0.028 0.006 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.001 σˆi
Sample period is 1963q1 to 1997q4 (140 observations)
σˆi represents the root mean squared error for each equation.
Table C (continued): AIDS estimated by OLS.
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